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THE 53RD HENRY J. MILLER DISTINGUISHED 
LECTURE SERIES                                         
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW 
APRIL 16, 2014                                                               
The Honorable John Paul Stevens (Ret.) 
 
In June of 1979, at the end of my fourth term as a Justice of the 
Supreme Court, I provided one of the five votes supporting the 
majority’s decision in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, the case 
holding that the Constitution does not require the police to obtain 
a search warrant to authorize the installation of a pen register to 
record the telephone numbers dialed from an individual suspect’s 
home telephone. My vote in the case was influenced by my 
experience as a naval officer during World War II. Today I plan to 
say a few words about that work and then to discuss the question 
whether the considerations supporting the holding in Smith apply 
to today’s practice of creating, using, and preserving a database 
including similar information about all of the telephone 
conversations in the United States, including the millions that use 
cell phones that did not even exist in 1979. 
I 
In the summer of 1941, Leon Smith, the Dean of Students at the 
University of Chicago who was serving as a confidential recruiting 
agent for the United States Navy, provided me with the opportunity 
to earn a commission as an Ensign if I successfully completed the 
Navy’s correspondence course in cryptography. One of the conditions 
of accepting that opportunity was an oath that I would never divulge 
either the existence of the course or the nature of my work for the 
Navy. Since Congress later enacted legislation that allows me to 
discuss that work today, I can tell you that I eventually received a 
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letter inviting me to go to the Great Lakes Naval Station to take a 
physical exam and formally apply for a commission. I did so on 
December 6th, 1941 and the Japanese responded by attacking Pearl 
Harbor the next morning. 
While my correspondence course had provided me with training 
in how to read the text of encoded and encrypted messages, when I 
was on active duty I served as a traffic analyst, rather than as a 
decoder or cryptographer. The job of the traffic analyst was to 
obtain intelligence about enemy activities by monitoring his 
communications without reading their text—what today is often 
called “metadata” analysis. That skill is critically different from 
actually reading intercepted messages. Knowledge about the volume 
of the traffic in certain locations, identities of senders and 
addressees, their choice of codes, and the length and timing of their 
messages may enable the analyst to draw useful inferences; those 
inferences, however, are far less reliable or informative than 
intelligence gained by reading the texts of the messages 
themselves. 
A dramatic event that occurred in April of 1943 when I was on 
duty as the traffic analysis watch officer in Pearl Harbor illustrates 
the vast difference between the two intelligence techniques. 
Intercepted traffic between the headquarters of the Japanese Navy’s 
Commander-in-Chief in Tokyo and its Base Force No. 8 at Rabaul, 
New Guinea, persuaded us that the enemy was developing a 
response to its recent defeats on Guadalcanal. Our conjectures were 
replaced by specific information after our cryptographers succeeded 
in reading the text of one of those messages, which informed us not 
only that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto—the architect of the attack on 
Pearl Harbor—would be making a morale-boosting tour of the area, 
but also provided us with the exact details of his planned flight 
from Rabaul to an airfield near Bougainville in the Solomon Islands. 
With the express approval of President Roosevelt, American aviators 
planned and executed an extremely difficult mission; they intercepted 
the Japanese flight and shot down Yamamoto’s plane. I was on 
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duty at the time and remember reading a dispatch reporting on the 
downing of “one eagle” and a number of sparrows. 
The difference between the quality of the intelligence obtained 
through cryptanalysis and the inferences obtained through traffic 
analysis is comparable to the difference between the intelligence 
obtained by listening to an intercepted telephone conversation and 
using a pen register to identify the parties to such a conversation. 
From the point of view of the participants to the conversation, there 
is a comparable difference in the magnitude of the invasion of 
privacy resulting from disclosures of the external characteristics of 
electronic messages and disclosures of their texts. The Japanese 
assumed—incorrectly as it developed—that we would not be able to 
read their encrypted messages, but they were certainly aware that we 
were monitoring their radio communications. They knew that we 
could, for example, use direction finders to pinpoint the location of 
a submarine that broke radio silence while at sea. 
Just as our enemies at war had a reasonable expectation that the 
texts of their communications would not be available to third 
parties, during peace potential criminals—like other citizens—
reasonably assume that third parties will not listen to their telephone 
conversations. That expectation is protected by the requirement 
that the police must obtain a warrant before eavesdropping on 
such conversations. Those citizens are, however, well aware of the 
fact that telephone companies record the external characteristics of 
all of those conversations and that public agencies have access to 
those records to enforce rules relating to their supervision of the 
industry. When I first confronted the issue presented by the pen 
record case in 1979, I was immediately reminded of the vast 
difference between cryptanalysis and traffic analysis that was so 
important during the war against Japan. It seemed appropriate to me 
then—as it does now—to recognize the same distinction during our 
ongoing war against crime. 
The average citizen’s expectations of privacy necessarily change 
in response to changes in society and changes in the law. The 
invention of the automobile, for example, enhanced freedom by 
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giving individuals the opportunity to engage in a multitude of new 
enjoyable and profitable activities. But it also created new threats 
of personal injury by careless drivers and misuse by potential 
criminals. One of the public’s responses to those threats was the 
requirement that every owner of a car obtain and display a license 
plate identifying him whenever the car is driven on a public street. 
That requirement facilitates the enforcement of traffic laws and the 
apprehension of persons engaged in criminal activity. It also 
impairs the value of the owner’s interest in preserving the privacy 
of activities associated with the use of the car. Despite the license 
requirement’s impact on privacy, it is now so familiar that few, if 
any, persons question the conclusion that it is amply justified. 
The fact that a new device—such as an automobile or a cell 
phone—may generate routine activities or new rules that give the 
public and the police access to information that a user of that device 
would prefer not to disclose is not a sufficient justification for 
imposing a warrant requirement as a pre-condition to police access 
to that information. Rather, in my judgment, it is part of the price 
that society pays for the benefits that the new device creates. The 
ability to refuse to take advantage of an invention is always a 
complete protection against the impairment of privacy that attends 
the decision to use it. By maintaining radio silence, the Japanese 
could have frustrated the work of our traffic analysts during World 
War II. 
On the other hand, it is important to recognize that even though 
there is a vast difference between the quality of the intelligence 
available through cryptanalysis and that derived from traffic 
analysis, the latter also is significant. I mention two details to 
support that conclusion. First, I was informed that the summary of 
the Japanese radio traffic during the preceding 24 hours that I 
prepared at the end of each of my watches was the first paper 
that Admiral Edward Layton, the Chief Intelligence Officer of the 
Pacific Fleet, read when he arrived in his office every morning. 
Second, the pen register that the police installed on the telephone 
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line of the defendant in Smith v. Maryland led to the apprehension 
and conviction of a criminal who might otherwise have gone free. 
In sum, I remain persuaded that the value of the benefits 
obtained by the police as a result of their use of the pen register 
to investigate suspicious activities far outweighed the value of 
telephone users’ interest in avoiding disclosure of the identity of 
the persons with whom they conversed on the phone. Mere 
suspicion, which is the basis for every police investigation, does 
not establish the probable cause required to obtain a search warrant. 
A constitutional rule that required a showing of probable cause to 
justify access to facts identifying the parties to telephone 
conversations would impose a cost on the police that far outweighs 
its benefits to the general public. 
II 
Newspaper accounts of the present government’s monitoring of 
telephone communications describe a program that differs from the 
use of the pen register in 1979 in both the magnitude of its potential 
invasion of interests in privacy and in its value for protecting 
public safety. Those differences have prompted debates about both 
the wisdom of the program and its constitutionality. Whether they 
support the conclusion that the program is unwise and should be 
modified or abandoned is, of course, different from the possible 
conclusion that the program is unconstitutional, and that the Smith 
case should be overruled or distinguished. 
The two most obvious differences point in different directions. 
The cost of the program is immense. Despite the efficiency and 
capacity of modern computers, the cost of maintaining and 
monitoring the database likely involves large expenditures, and 
almost cer tainly increases as the size of the program continues to 
grow. Like searching for a needle in a field of haystacks, that cost 
may well provide a sufficient justification for imposing significant 
limits on the scope of the program. On the other hand, the program 
is designed not to combat ordinary local criminal activity, but to 
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prevent terrorist activity like the attack on the World Trade Center 
in 2001. The possibility of such an attack is real and the possibility 
that the program will lessen that danger is also real. Making 
judgments about the relative importance of those possibilities is 
obviously the business of our policy-makers rather than judges. 
While neither the cost nor the potential value of the program 
determines its constitutionality, other differences between the 
program and the installation of a pen register may be relevant to the 
constitutional issue. First, unlike the police examination of the use 
of a single telephone for just a few days, the current programs involve 
the possible permanent retention of a massive quantity of records. 
The brief invasion of a single suspect’s expectation of privacy is 
quite different from the on-going possibility that records in the 
database may one-day reveal private information about any of the 
millions of telephone users in the country. If measured by the number 
of people whose expectation of privacy is potentially at risk, or by 
the duration of that risk, the invasion seems unreasonable. But if it 
is measured by the likelihood that any particular individual—or, 
indeed, any group of innocent individuals—will be affected, the 
possibility is infinitesimal, and certainly not unreasonable. 
Instead of choosing between those two possible approaches to the 
Fourth Amendment issue, it seems to me more helpful to focus on 
the threat to privacy that is posed by any additions to the database, 
or by government access to the database for the purpose of 
investigating the use of a particular telephone. The reasoning that 
the majority endorsed in the Smith case in 1979 placed a zero 
value on the privacy interest because the identity of the persons called 
on the defendant’s telephone—unlike what those persons said when 
they used the phone—was routinely disclosed to the telephone 
company (without any restrictions on its possible use) and therefore 
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. That reasoning would also 
apply to each new addition to the database. The fact that many 
millions of additions to the database may be made on a daily basis 
does not, it seems to me, make the impact on any one individual 
any greater than the impact on the defendant in the Smith case. 
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But even if the Fourth Amendment may not require the issuance 
of a warrant before data is added to the database, perhaps it may 
impose some sort of barrier to official use of information that has 
already been accumulated. Such a judge-made rule might prohibit 
access to the data without probable cause to believe a subscriber 
is planning or engaging in unlawful activity. The effect of such a 
rule, in my judgment, would be profoundly unwise because it would 
render the database useless for the investigation of merely suspicious 
activity. 
There is a distinction of constitutional magnitude between 
probable cause that is sufficient to support the issuance of a search 
warrant and mere suspicion that is sufficient to motivate police 
investigations but not sufficient to obtain a warrant. Using the 
database to identify persons calling or receiving calls from a 
telephone used by a suspected terrorist might help identify other 
potential terrorists without shedding any light on on-going or 
imminent criminal activity. Even if those possible identifications 
might one day be valuable, that possibility would seldom, if ever, 
rise to the level of probable cause. Restrictions on access to 
information in the database would impair its usefulness, and the 
introduction of a probable cause requirement might well frustrate 
critical investigations of suspicious activity. 
My appraisal of the value of the public interest in avoiding the 
need to obtain a warrant to authorize either the continued addition 
of new information to the database or the use of information 
already included in the database returns me to the experience that 
affected my vote in the Smith case in 1979 and prompts this 
caveat. The inferences that a traffic analyst derives from the external 
characteristics of radio transmissions qualify as suspicious 
circumstances justifying further investigation, but seldom are 
themselves a sufficient basis for concrete decisions. Those 
inferences are far less reliable or useful than the facts that can be 
obtained from the use of other intelligence techniques such as global 
positioning systems that can track the precise movements and 
location of vehicles. Because the data obtained from GPS sources 
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is comparable to the text of intercepted messages, both in its 
usefulness and its impact on privacy, and is unlike the inferences 
obtained from pen registers or traffic analysis, what I have said 
about the latter does not apply to the former. 
In sum, I remain persuaded that the Smith case was correctly 
decided in 1979 and that it supports the conclusion that the 
preservation and use of records identifying the parties to telephone 
conversations does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Whether the 
database provides benefits that are justified by its cost is an issue 
for others to debate. Historians may join forces with intelligence 
experts in opposition to reporters concerned with protecting the 
confidentiality of their sources during that debate, but it is a 
subject on which I am not prepared to comment today. 
 
Thank you for your attention. 
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